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Background: In much of the world, President George W. Bush was not admired for his foreign policy and
diplomacy. It is therefore ironic that Bush’s single most uncontested foreign policy triumph was an instance of what
has now become known as “health diplomacy”. In 2003 Bush launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief, a five-year $15 billion initiative to fight HIV/AIDS, mostly in Africa. The president’s pragmatic health diplomacy
may well save his foreign policy legacy. This article argues that a middle power such as South Africa should consider
a similar instrumental AIDS diplomatic strategy, to rehabilitate its public health as well as foreign policy images.
Discussion: This article reflects on the emergence and contemporary practice of health diplomacy. In particular, it
explores the potential of niche areas within health diplomacy to become constructive focal points of emerging
middle powers’ foreign policies. Middle powers often apply niche diplomacy to maximise their foreign policy impact,
particularly by pursuing a multilateral agenda. The literature on middle powers indicates that such foreign policy
ambitions and concomitant diplomacy mostly act to affirm the global status quo. Instead, this paper argues that
there may well be niches within health diplomacy in particular that can be used to actually challenge the existing
global order. Emerging middle powers in particular can use niche areas within health diplomacy in a critical
theoretical manner, so that foreign policy and diplomacy become a project of emancipation and transformation,
rather than an affirmation of the world as it is.
Summary: The article first describes the emergence and contemporary practice of health diplomacy; this is followed
by a discussion of niche diplomacy, in particular as it applies to the foreign policy agendas of emerging middle
powers. It then reviews South African foreign policy and diplomacy, before situating these policies within the
context of emerging mechanisms of south-south multilateralism. The article concludes by synthesizing these
elements and advocating for a South African AIDS diplomacy, emphasizing its potential to galvanize a global project
of emancipation.
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When the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries
decided at their 2001 meeting in Genoa to establish the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria to
increase international funding for interventions against
the three diseases, the United States was a leading sup-
porter. The fund was a public-private partnership set up in
2002 with formal status as a foundation under Swiss law.
In the fund’s first two years, the United States accounted
for nearly half the total amount pledged and challenged
other donors to increase their contributions. By 2008 theCorrespondence: ppfourie@sun.ac.za
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orGlobal Fund had committed $15.6 billion to AIDS activ-
ities in 140 countries [1].
Additionally, in 2003 U.S. president George W. Bush
launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR), a five-year, $15 billion initiative to fight HIV/
AIDS, mostly in Africa. PEPFAR has been called the lar-
gest initiative ever undertaken by a single country to ad-
dress a disease, and because of the amount of resources it
provided, the U.S. government strengthened its position
as a major funder of AIDS activities in the global south.
By the end of 2008, the program had provided treatment
to two million people in 15 focus countries, 12 of which
were African [2].his is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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much of the world Bush was not admired for his foreign
policy and diplomacy. Because he chose not to follow
the liberal institutional norms and mechanisms that had
been established since World War II, Bush was accused
of practicing a diplomacy of circumvention. It is there-
fore ironic that Bush’s single most uncontested foreign
policy triumph was an instance of what has now become
known as “health diplomacy.” Both PEPFAR and the
Global Fund are exemplars of a radical shift in global
health governance that may well save Bush’s foreign
policy legacy.
The practice of health diplomacy is not limited to
major powers such as the United States, however. Niche
areas of health diplomacy have the potential to become
constructive focal points of emerging middle powers’
foreign policies as well. Indeed, middle powers often
apply niche diplomacy to maximize their foreign policy
impact, particularly by pursuing a multilateral agenda.
Although such foreign policy ambitions and concomi-
tant diplomacy mostly act to affirm the global status
quo, there may well be niches within health diplomacy
in particular that can be used to challenge the existing
global order. Emerging middle powers can use these
niche areas within health diplomacy as tools for challen-
ging and working to change the status quo so that for-
eign policy and diplomacy become a project of
emancipation and transformation, rather than an affirm-
ation of the world as it is. At the same time, niche areas
within health diplomacy can serve a different, domestic
role: to make explicit and to calibrate emerging middle
powers’ foreign policy priorities.
South Africa is an example of a young democracy that
seems to have lost its way in how it considers and prac-
tices diplomacy it is what one observer has called a
“rogue democracy” [3]. On paper, the country’s foreign
policy is aspirational, idealistic, and fairly typical of an
emerging middle power, but its actions have been criti-
cized as inconsistent, confusing, and even sinister. In the
same way that South Africa transformed its horrific his-
tory of racism and apartheid to become a beacon of hu-
man rights internationally, however, it can transform its
appalling AIDS burden to take a global lead on this
issue. AIDS diplomacy can serve as a thematic hub or
leitmotif around which the aspirational elements of
South African foreign policy can be aligned and
operationalized. Moreover, South African AIDS diplo-
macy can be used to drive a transformationalist global
agenda not only on issues of global health governance,
but in terms of global and multilateral reform more
broadly if pursued thoughtfully.
This paper first describes the emergence and contem-
porary practice of health diplomacy, followed by a dis-
cussion of niche diplomacy, in particular as it applies tothe foreign policy agendas of emerging middle powers. It
then reviews South African foreign policy and diplomacy
before situating these policies within the context of
emerging mechanisms of south-south multilateralism.
The paper concludes by synthesizing these elements and
advocating for South African AIDS diplomacy, empha-
sizing its potential to galvanize a global project of
emancipation.
Discussion
The emergence of health in foreign policy
In September 2006 the foreign ministers of Brazil, France,
Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand
launched the Global Health and Foreign Policy Initiative,
and on March 20, 2007, they issued the Oslo Ministerial
Declaration, which defines global health as a pressing for-
eign policy issue:
In today’s era of globalisation and interdependence
there is an urgent need to broaden the scope of
foreign policy. Together, we face a number of pressing
challenges that require concerted responses and
collaborative efforts. We must encourage new ideas,
seek and develop new partnerships and mechanisms,
and create new paradigms of cooperation. We believe
that health is the most important, yet still broadly
neglected, long-term foreign policy issue of our time.
[. . .] We have therefore agreed to make impact on
health a point of departure and a defining lens that
each of our countries will use to examine key
elements of foreign policy and development strategies,
and to engage in a dialogue on how to deal with
policy options from this perspective [4]. [Emphasis
added]
The declaration states that its aim is to harness the
benefits of globalization, and it identifies an agenda
that includes, but is not limited to, the following
actions:
• governing global health security, focusing on
preparedness in foreign policy, the establishment of
global surveillance mechanisms to identify
epidemiological threats to collective security, and the
timely and concerted mobilization of resources to
combat such threats;
• identifying and addressing the current shortage and
maldistribution of trained health workers;
• aligning action in cases of natural disasters and other
crises;
• responding in a concerted fashion to the global AIDS
pandemic in particular;
• combating climate change and the negative impacts
it has on global health distribution;
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priorities, the allocation of aid and resources, and the
structural barriers to greater material equity and justice
in the world;
• establishing trade policies and measures to
implement and monitor agreements, particularly with
regard to pharmaceutical access; and
• developing the global health governance architecture,
bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally.
Although the agenda for action and the aspirations for
improved global health outcomes are not new, the
emphasis on linking health so explicitly to foreign policy
certainly is. The declaration shows that health is an issue
that can initiate dialogue and cooperation across bor-
ders, thus building trust among state and non-state
actors.
Shortly after the Oslo Declaration was issued, the head
of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the for-
eign ministers of France and Norway issued a word of
caution: for health to be a sustainable lens for foreign
policy thinking and agenda setting, it must be main-
streamed into the training of diplomats. In addition, they
urged that an overemphasis on health security concerns
not overshadow the opportunity afforded by the Oslo
Declaration to use health as a constructive and novel
perspective to shape international, transnational, and
global action [5].
The latter is an important caveat, as the history of glo-
bal health is often more closely associated with the
governance of health threats than with the search for
equity, justice, and well being [6]. For instance, the first
International Sanitary Conference, in 1851, focused on
combating the spread of cholera, plague, and yellow
fever. Health diplomacy as it was then practiced focused
mainly on negotiating international disease control con-
ventions, the first one of which was concluded in 1903.
The International Organization for Public Hygiene was
established in 1907, but its role was to protect inter-
national commerce from the possibility of free-riding
epidemics. Gradually the architecture of international
health governance expanded, culminating in the estab-
lishment of the WHO in 1948—almost as an after-
thought to the creation of the UN family. Yet, the
International Health Regulations (IHR) drawn up through
this body remain to this day mainly concerned with sur-
veillance and the threat of global epidemics to collect-
ive security. This mindset reflects the broad Realist
definition of diplomacy: “the official means by which
one state formally relates to other states . . . [as] a
mechanism—one among many—used in furtherance of
the national interest” [7].
It is not surprising, then, that early in the last decade,
and especially after the 9/11 attacks on the United States,policymakers came to view infectious diseases as threats
to global security and stability. AIDS in particular was
seen as a proxy for the cause of potential state fragility in
the developing world, which in turn was conceptualized as
the main driver of global terrorism. Over the last few
years, however, it has become clear that AIDS and other
diseases are not the cause of global insecurity and state
failure; rather, domestic and multilateral policy interven-
tions should focus on the real drivers of the epidemic, so-
cial determinants of health. Despite this shift in thinking
about the global AIDS pandemic, policymakers neverthe-
less tend to focus on the “high politics” of health issues
that is, their security aspects rather than on “low politics”
in which health issues are seen as a reflection of human
dignity [8].
The Oslo Declaration warns that equating health dip-
lomacy with health security would underestimate the
emergence and limit the agenda of a multitude of new
actors and resources devoted to the governance of global
health. By 2007 the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s
budget surpassed that of the WHO, and the Foundation
is now a member of a new elite of global health govern-
ance the so-called Health-8 (H-8) that also includes the
WHO, the World Bank, the GAVI Alliance, United Na-
tions Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Popu-
lation Fund (UNFPA), UNAIDS, and the Global Fund.
The emphasis of global health governance and diplo-
macy is on cultivating partnerships among state and
non-state actors acting transnationally. This reflects the
definition of health diplomacy as offering “new mecha-
nisms to implement ambitious global health initiatives
while at the same time securing favorable perceptions in
a changing diplomatic space” [9].
The rapid increase in the number of actors and issues
on the global health agenda has galvanized the search
for greater alignment and concerted actions, with the
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 being one
example of a broader effort to reduce waste and duplica-
tion [10]. This push has become even stronger in light
of the reduction in funding available for global public
health, due to the impact of the ongoing global financial
crisis. A consensus is developing that the focus of low-
and middle-income countries in particular should be on
strengthening health systems. Global health funding, for
now, seems to have flatlined [11], exacerbating the need
for improved global health governance, innovative health
diplomacy, and better coordination among those who
matter, about what matters and how to distribute the de-
creasing resources available. Since 2003, the South
Africa’s support from PEPFAR has been billions of Rands,
and during a visit to the United States in mid-2012 Dep-
uty President Kgalema Motlanthe appealed to the Ameri-
can government not to reduce their financial support for
AIDS treatment and prevention programmes in South
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ment has received assurances that PEPFAR funding will
continue for another two years, although it is then very
likely to decline significantly [12].
Niche diplomacy
Those states and other actors that have been most prom-
inent and successful at health diplomacy seem to be the
ones that are best able to prioritize and focus their efforts.
Former Australian foreign affairs minister Gareth Evans
notes that less powerful states should undertake “niche
diplomacy, which involves concentrating resources in spe-
cific areas best able to generate returns worth having, ra-
ther than trying to cover the field” [13]. In the practice of
diplomacy an actor should not try to be all and do all for
everyone. Unfocused and ineffectual diplomacy is fre-
quently the consequence of lofty foreign policy documents
that are conceptualized in such broad and abstract terms
that they have no sustainable traction in their application.
Even very powerful states understand the importance
of selecting specific priorities when they practice health
diplomacy. For instance, during the second half of the
Bush administration, the secretary of Health and Human
Services, Michael Leavitt, made it clear that the attain-
ment of soft power—that is, cooption by persuasion ra-
ther than coercion—would be the aim of American
medical diplomacy and humanitarian efforts. For Leavitt,
public diplomacy—appealing directly to the population
of other states—was a key element of public relations
and a goal in itself: “I have heard HIV/AIDS victims in
distant villages of Africa say the words ‘U-S-A’ with their
lips and ‘thank you’ with their eyes” [14]. Of course, self-
interest is never far away; Leavitt goes on to say that “[s]
oft power builds trust for moments when hard power is
required” [15]. Using health diplomacy to attain soft
power has hardly been a strategy exclusive to the Bush
presidency or the Republican party, however. The idea
of “medical diplomacy” was introduced in 1978 by the
special assistant to the president for health issues during
the Carter administration [16].
Developing countries have also benefited from identi-
fying niches in a more focused health diplomacy; Brazil
is a key example. In 1988 Brazil formally recognized the
right to health in its constitution, and soon thereafter it
made health a central theme of its foreign policy actions.
When antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) became available for
the treatment of HIV/AIDS in 1996, the Brazilian gov-
ernment used its health-rights emphasis to increase ac-
cess to these pharmaceuticals in order to provide
universal treatment to all HIV-positive people in the
country. Brazil cultivated transnational issue coalitions
with NGOs as well as other states in the global south and
granted compulsory licences for the local production of
generic ARVs. Large pharmaceutical companies in theglobal north were outraged; some of the actions that
Brazil pursued were illegal (or deemed as such) within
the context of the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the newly established
World Trade Organization (WTO). Nevertheless, Brazil’s
transnational coalition won the day. In the process, Brazil
became the first developing country to offer free ARV
treatment to people living with HIV, despite claims by
the World Bank that such a policy was not cost-effective
[17]. More recently, Brazil has also played a key role in
negotiating the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC), using soft power to achieve its goals by
serving as an example for domestic tobacco control, en-
gaging in coalition politics, and providing leadership dur-
ing the negotiation process [18].
Other developing states have selected a more fo-
cused medical diplomacy to achieve their foreign pol-
icy goals. Cuba has prioritized south-south links and
seeks to build non-Western coalitions to foster a broader
“anti-imperialist” global agenda. Although such language
seems quite dated in the contemporary world, Cuba has
been remarkably successful at achieving its southern soli-
darity by training and/or providing health personnel as
its specific niche within health diplomacy. It should be
noted, of course, that Venezuela foots the bill for most of
Cuba’s medical largesse [19].
Finding a niche within the broad field of diplomacy—
and even within health diplomacy more closely—seems
to have more easily attainable outcomes for less power-
ful states. Such states may have “technical and entrepre-
neurial leadership on the world stage on specific issues”
[20]. This is also a particular feature of middle powers,
which may not seek power for their own sake, but instead
act as “norm entrepreneurs” on issues where they have
existing credibility. South Africa is a case in point: the
country managed to survive its racist and divisive past
and, after it democratized, in 1994 President Nelson Man-
dela went to work to establish the country as a symbol of
nonracialism and reconciliation. South Africa achieved a
level of credibility and stature by negotiating a peaceful
transition, setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, and establishing one of the most progressive liberal
constitutions in the world. Mandela and his successors
have capitalized on this credibility to project South African
influence on the multilateral stage.
Middle powers such as Brazil, India, and South Africa
also use transnational issue networks and links with global
social movements to achieve their foreign policy goals.
The case of Brazil in the WTO is an example of this; so
too is South Africa and the Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC). In the late 1990s South Africa lobbied with
Brazilian activists and members of civil society in the glo-
bal north to successfully challenge large pharmaceutical
companies’ insistence that the country should not be
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analyst notes, “[M]iddle power states are ideally suited to
partner with NGOs in the pursuit of selected issues on the
international agenda” [21].
These examples of global health diplomacy by middle
owers are uncharacteristic of how traditional middle pow-
ers supposedly operate. Middle powers typically have a
narrow band of foreign policy goals that they wish to
achieve, but they mostly work within the multilateral sys-
tem; they do not usually challenge the status quo or the
rules of the game. Instead, they stabilize and legitimize the
system and act as good international citizens that affirm
the way things work. This is particularly true for trad-
itional middle powers in the global north (e.g., Norway,
Australia, and Canada).
In contrast, influential middle powers from the global
south do in fact challenge the status quo—but they stop
short of calling for revolution [22]. Countries such as
Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey may be inter-
ested in reforming rather than discarding the rules of
the game. Such states have the potential to be the “norm
entrepreneurs” that will push the envelope and call for
reform, for altruistic as well as for selfish reasons: for in-
stance, South Africa and Brazil agree that the UN is a
dinosaur of the Cold War and that change is essential
both to allow greater representation and to reflect con-
temporary international politics more accurately; at the
same time, these states are interested in obtaining their
own permanent seats on a reformed UN Security Council.
South Africa’s (very) foreign policy
The fundamental tension between traditional and emer-
ging middle powers identified above—namely, their role
in affirming the status quo on the one hand while push-
ing to reform the global system on the other has been
characteristic of South Africa’s foreign policy expression
since the country democratized in 1994.
The Mandela government (1994–1999) emphasized the
imperative for the former pariah state to integrate with the
international community, and South African foreign policy
during those years focused mainly on good international
citizenship. At home, Mandela prioritized nation building
and reconciliation, and abroad his government projected
South Africa as a good, clean middle power with massive
human rights capital [23]. South Africa did not challenge
the global order by demanding any rewrite of existing
international rules. Instead, Mandela’s Department of For-
eign Affairs (DFA) was keen to be seen as a peacemaker
on the African continent, a bridge builder between the
global south and the global north, and a beacon of hope in
a sea of injustice. South Africa was rewarded for its peace-
ful transition by being elected to chair multilateral bodies
such as the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Keenlysensitive to South Africa’s previous reputation as a re-
gional bully during the apartheid regime, Mandela made a
point to underplay the country’s status as the obvious re-
gional and continental hegemon. Even when in 1998 a
coup threatened the stability of the Kingdom of Lesotho, a
sovereign state landlocked within South Africa, the Man-
dela government took pains to ensure SADC approval and
stewardship of the eventual military intervention.
Whereas Mandela rarely ventured beyond rhetorical
criticism of the injustices of the global order, his succes-
sor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008) had a distinctly different
view. A former member of the Politburo of the South
African Communist Party, Mbeki was a pragmatist who
steered domestic economic, industrial, and trade policies
towards liberalization. A keen intellect, Mbeki crafted his
domestic and foreign policies based on ideas rather than
simple opportunism. Foreign policy during the Mbeki era
was an accommodation of a mosaic of ideological im-
pulses. On the one hand Mbeki was a realist, aware that
the country would be excluded from the benefits of
globalization if it followed any policy trajectory that
would scare off foreign investors. On the other hand he
was an African Nationalist, using the lens of south-south
or global southern solidarity to describe (and criticize)
the way the world works [24]. Mbeki was fond of using
the rhetoric of Marxist or structuralist thinking to appor-
tion blame to the global north for their continuing im-
perial ambitions in Africa and in the global south more
broadly. His Africanist tilt meant that he often rejected
any intervention or criticism from the West in particular,
insisting that Africans should seek African solutions to
African problems.
As a result, South African foreign policy under Mbeki
often seemed paradoxical [25]. The government insisted
that it was guided by an African agenda with a strong hu-
man rights and a multilateral focus, while at the same
time it increasingly acted to support counter-hegemonic
regimes. For instance, during South Africa’s membership
of the UN Human Rights Commission and its first two-
year tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN
Security Council (2007–2008), the country consistently
blocked Western-led resolutions to condemn rape as a
political or military weapon; it was opposed to the indict-
ment of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir as a war
criminal and the push to bring him before the Inter-
national Criminal Court in The Hague; and it repeatedly
did not support resolutions condemning the regimes of
Iran, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe for serious breaches of
international law. South Africa seemed to talk the talk
of human rights as its niche and its main driving force in
foreign affairs, but it walked the walk of quixotic and blan-
ket south-south solidarity to such an extent that it squan-
dered much of its credibility as a champion of universal
human rights [26].
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sor, President Jacob Zuma (2008–), who treats foreign re-
lations in an insipid, business-as-usual way. Zuma’s
foreign policy is what his diplomats make of it, and rhet-
orically it is a continuation of Mbeki’s priorities, which
are, in order of importance, “the African agenda,” which
has no clear definition; south-south cooperation; the cen-
trality of multilateralism; north–south dialogue; and is-
sues of global governance [27]. Foreign policy observers
have noted that South Africa’s relations with the rest of
the world are in need of a fresh motive; hollow notions
regarding human rights and good international citizen-
ship as stated in formal policy documents have become
stale. In the words of one analyst, “There are countries
that have established good reputations in their promo-
tion of human rights in their foreign policy. But the flip
side to this is that countries can lose their reputations.
South Africa has certainly lost its reputation and practic-
ally all the gains of the Mandela era” [28].
The South African government itself identified the
need for a renewed and coherent foreign policy focus.
The DFA held a heads of missions meeting in February
2005 to consider strategic foreign policy priorities, and
there was a consensus that the country should seek “in-
novative ways” to position itself as “an active agent of
progressive change” [29]. It is clear that the DFA itself
wanted to pursue an emerging middle power agenda that
did not shirk from challenging existing orthodoxies and
modes of global governance. In her analysis, Yolanda
Kemp Spies, a former long-serving South African diplo-
mat, updates this position by proposing for South Africa
a more selective, ad hoc approach than it has thus far
adopted in its multilateral projects. A more focused mul-
tilateral role will require rationalisation of foreign policy
priorities. In establishing these, the government could
draw on the expertise and “new policy ideas widely avail-
able in global civil society” by ensuring closer cooper-
ation with transnational issue networks [30].
Health in the new multilateralism
In the search for a niche and for improved agency for
South African foreign policy, interesting themes emerge
or are confirmed: “innovative” diplomacy, “transnational
issue networks,” and “multilateralism” are clear; so too is
an emphasis on the pursuit of issue diplomacy as a strat-
egy available to emerging middle powers. There are cer-
tainly signs that South Africa’s foreign policy and the
global political environment would accommodate such a
shift, particularly in light of the emergence during the last
decade of new south-south as well as north–south multi-
lateralism: the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) grouping
was established in 2003; South Africa recently became the
‘S’ in the BRICS alliance that also includes Brazil, Russia,
India, and China; and in 2008 the G-8 was replaced withthe G-20 (a north–south grouping of the strongest inter-
national economies and “norm entrepreneurial” states).
The question arises whether any or all three of these
groupings might act as vehicles for exactly the kind of
niche diplomacy role that South Africa seeks. Could health
be the transnational issue that enables emerging middle
powers in particular to pursue novel global networks and
more achievable and sustainable foreign policy outcomes?
Existing opinions on this question are either silent on
health specifically as a niche area for emerging middle
power diplomacy, or they express tentative, qualified en-
thusiasm. The G-20 is viewed as an important grouping,
but for the moment it is too new and unwieldy, and it
may represent too many divergent members to facilitate
the crafting of a coherent position on global health. At
the moment the G-20 is most concerned with moderat-
ing the threats of the ongoing global financial crisis.
However, the G-8 could serve as an example for the es-
tablishment in the G-20 of productive working groups
on health issues specifically; this could be valuable in the
pursuit of a shared consensus, first on health and devel-
opment governance issues that do not elicit radically di-
vergent points of view, and then gradually by engaging
with issues of more serious disagreement.
In principle, most G-20 countries agree on many is-
sues of global health governance, including the need to
combat HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria; the prioritization
of maternal and child health; and the imperative of im-
proved aid efficiency and effectiveness. Potential G-20
working groups on these and other issues might build
trust and also provide a forum for negotiation around
more contentious issues [31]. Jorge Heine, a former Chil-
ean ambassador to South Africa, warns that South Africa
does not seem to realize the potential of a more “niche”
focus within the G-20, and that the country does not
“seem to have fully realised what the G-20 entails and ha
[s] taken it rather nonchalantly” [32].
South Africa seems to view the IBSA grouping more ser-
iously, and it has used it quite effectively as an emerging
middle power coalition to challenge global rules around
health. India is a prominent manufacturer of ARVs and
other pharmaceuticals, and Brazil and South Africa have
actively and successfully advocated for amendments to the
TRIPS agreement, specifically to make ARVs available in
their domestic environments. In doing so, IBSA has been
successful at “soft balancing” that is, flexible coalition-
building in global institutions which “does not directly
challenge U.S. military preponderance, but rather uses
non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine the
superpower’s unilateral policies” [33]. This strategy can
also work for IBSA in other areas of global governance, as
well as on other issues [34]. The trilateral alliance defines
itself as a means towards broader cooperation among de-
veloping countries. They share a diagnosis of the failing
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something recognised by the institutions themselves, and
see in the application of regional representivity a means of
re-legitimising these institutions, as well as of positioning
themselves therein in a leadership role.
South Africa also appears to be more enthusiastic
about its new BRICS membership than about the G-20.
Yet, South Africa’s membership in this alliance seems to
be more reflective of ideological solidarity than of practi-
cality. The truth is that BRICS itself does not pay that
much attention to health, beyond citing it as one among
a range of issues that reflect the imperfections and injus-
tices of the world. The most basic comparative metrics
confirm that South Africa is an outlier in BRICS: its
population, economy, and relatively low global status
even as an emerging middle power render it the odd one
out, and its membership has more to do with existing
BRIC members’ consideration that they need an African
member, as well as another demonstration of symbolic
southern solidarity, than with South Africa’s diplomatic
capabilities or status. For South Africa, one prominent
attraction of membership is the opportunity to develop
closer relations with China.
This does not mean that BRICS necessarily excludes the
promise of health diplomacy. These three examples of
multilateralism—IBSA, the G-20, and BRICS—all have the
potential to improve global health. There are strong sig-
nals that IBSA in particular could make health diplomacy
a mainstay of its international and transnational interac-
tions. These organizations should seriously consider the
various transformative roles that they can play: providing
financial assistance for health projects and supplying med-
ical goods and services to very poor countries in their im-
mediate geographical neighborhoods; providing focused
technical assistance in specific health niche areas; continu-
ing to improve access to medicines and intellectual prop-
erty, as there is already a history of significant success in
this area; modeling effective health-sector framework-
building to less developed countries; making an explicit
decision to play a more proactive role in global health gov-
ernance; and bolstering the link between health and for-
eign policy [35].
AIDS diplomacy as a project of emancipation
In 1978, 134 representatives of WHO member states gath-
ered in the Soviet Union and crafted the Alma Ata Declar-
ation, calling for “Health for All by the Year 2000.” The
declaration demanded “the attainment by all citizens of
the world by the year 2000 of a level of health that will
permit them to lead a socially and economically product-
ive life” [36]. Two countries then embedded health as a
fundamental human right in their constitutions: Brazil in
1988, as noted earlier, and South Africa in 1996. In 2000
the UN identified its Millennium Development Goals(MDGs), three of which are explicitly devoted to health. In
2007 the Oslo Ministerial Declaration underlined the need
to integrate health in countries’ foreign policies.
This short history has an interesting trajectory; it re-
flects a growing Kantian impetus to apply power for
good, for the pursuit of dignity for all, and to change the
world for the better. At least that is the aspiration—an
ambition that many states have imperfectly pursued.
Health diplomacy has at long last been formalized on the
global agenda and an opportunity exists for states and
non-state actors to use a health lens to facilitate a trans-
formative moment. According to critical theorists [37,38],
international relations should be not only a field of study
that describes the world as it is, but is also applied to en-
hance opportunities for emancipation. This includes free-
dom from want, allowing society to maximize its potential,
and transforming the world and global governance to
achieve dignity for all.
This is idealistic, but the principle is laudable. The appli-
cation of a health lens in foreign policymaking might be
one way in which emerging middle powers can find trac-
tion in the international system. But health is a broad field,
with various normative underpinnings and contradictory
agendas, domestically as well as globally. The established
notion of niche diplomacy begets the identification of
transnational issue networks that can be used to advocate
for improved health outcomes. To that end, South Africa
can and should explore AIDS diplomacy within the
broader perspective of health diplomacy to reclaim the
sense of purpose in its foreign policy, to salvage the hu-
man rights focus as well as the moral stature that it seems
to have lost.
Why AIDS diplomacy?
Nearly six million South Africans are HIV-positive; this
constitutes one in every five members of the country’s
adult population. Clearly, the South African AIDS epi-
demic is an exceptional event that will define much of
the country’s image and demand a great deal of its policy
and fiscal attention for many years to come.
Many in the country feel a sense of outrage that the
“Rainbow Nation” survived the horror of apartheid only
to be ravaged by such an insidious virus in the infancy
of its democracy. Adding insult to injury, the country’s
history of managing the epidemic is an anthology of
some of the most pathological elements of African gov-
ernance: the apartheid government (1948–1994) ignored
the epidemic, welcoming it as a way to cull those deemed
“undesirable” in South African society: gays, blacks, pros-
titutes, and drug users. The Mandela government (1994–
1999) likewise looked elsewhere, concentrating on con-
solidating democratic institutions and nation building.
Possibly worse yet, the Mbeki administration (1999–
2008) was accused of AIDS denialism, blaming the viral
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the West and refusing to make ARVs available to millions
of citizens [39]. In the process, between 2000 and 2005
more than 330,000 South Africans suffered and died pre-
ventable deaths, and more than 50,000 infants were born
HIV-positive because the government prevented their
mothers from accessing medication that would have re-
stricted postnatal transmission of the virus [40]. Max
Essex of Harvard University refers to South Africa’s AIDS
policy during the Mbeki years as “a case of bad, or even
evil, public health” [41].
Yet, since Mbeki’s departure and South Africa’s AIDS
policy rehabilitation in 2008, the country has failed to
take up global leadership on HIV/AIDS. There is excel-
lent precedent for South Africa to capitalize on its ability
to overcome dread, however: after apartheid, the country
proactively cultivated an image of itself as a nonracial
and tolerant society, and it worked hard to project this
image via its human rights-focused foreign policy. Un-
fortunately, the current South African government has
thus far chosen to ignore the lessons of AIDS that it
could share with the world; HIV and AIDS do not re-
ceive special mention in the country’s foreign policy as
an issue that can be used to enable conversations about
broader challenges of global health governance. This is a
missed opportunity.
The irony is that South Africa had been successful at
AIDS diplomacy not that long ago. During the Mandela
and first Mbeki administrations, several important pieces
of legislation were introduced and case law came to fru-
ition that further served to entrench a human rights ap-
proach to HIV and AIDS. The Medicines Act of 1997
was the first and had the highest media profile, domes-
tically and internationally. In brief, the act contained
provisions that would make it possible for the South
African government to parallel import ARVs from
abroad and to issue compulsory licenses to local
pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce generic AIDS
drugs at a fraction of what it would cost to purchase
such drugs from their foreign patent holders. Such mea-
sures are legal under the WTO TRIPS rules (of which
South Africa is a signatory), but the Medicines Act be-
came controversial when the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), representing
39 pharmaceutical companies, decided in 1998 to take
the Mandela government to court on this issue.
During the second half of the Mandela administration,
the Clinton administration placed immense pressure on
South Africa to honor the patent rights of the American
companies that developed the drugs, going so far as to
put South Africa on the U.S. “Super 301” trade watch
list, which according to the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 au-
thorizes the President to take all appropriate action, in-
cluding retaliation, to obtain the removal of any act,policy, or practice of a foreign government that violates
an international trade agreement or is unjustified, unrea-
sonable, or discriminatory, and that burdens or restricts
U.S. commerce. Many observers accused the U.S. gov-
ernment of using bullying tactics to put profits above
the rights of people living with the virus, and eventually
the issue became a political and public relations disaster
for the U.S. government.
The South African government (both under Mandela
and in the early years of the Mbeki administration) did
manage, however, to put on the international agenda the
issue of HIV-positive people’s rights to essential drugs.
The issue also garnered wide support from sectors of civil
society; the TAC and the trade union COSATU in particu-
lar established links in South Africa and abroad in the glo-
bal south as well as the global north—to drive popular
resistance and demonstrations against the PhRMA court
action. In April 2001 PhRMA decided to withdraw its case
against the South African government; South African and
international AIDS communities hailed this move as a vic-
tory for human rights in the context of HIV and AIDS.
South Africa had triumphed in a David versus Goliath bat-
tle against big business. However, the elation was short-
lived: at the news conference following PhRMA’s decision
to withdraw its legal challenge, the South African minister
of health announced that the drugs remained too expen-
sive to parallel import or to manufacture locally.
Although South Africa did not fully capitalize on its
triumph, the PhRMA case did result in several interest-
ing foreign policy actions. First, the South African
government focused on a single issue that it pursued ro-
bustly in front of domestic as well as international
audiences. Additionally, a transnational issue network
consisting of state and non-state actors cooperated to
make victory possible. Finally, in the process, South
Africa achieved success, not only when the pharmaceut-
ical companies abandoned their case and the country
was removed from the American trade watch list, but
also at the WTO where, in November 2001, it advocated
successfully with Brazil and other states to amend the
TRIPS regime on pharmaceuticals. This is an excellent
example of emerging middle powers cooperating with
broader issue networks in an instance of health di-
plomacy not to challenge an entire global governance
model, but to reform health multilateralism.
Unfortunately, South Africans have thus far lacked the
will to rekindle their moral leadership on global AIDS
governance. If they chose to do so, this might go some
way not only to redeem Mbeki’s genocidal AIDS policies
at home, but also to rehabilitate the country’s foreign
policy stature. Such a move could serve an important
ideological purpose, and instead of simply accepting
AIDS policy “best practice” from the global north, it
could boost South Africa’s status as a middle power that
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health governance globally. South African AIDS diplo-
macy might become a metaphor for transformation; it
could come to represent a broader project of emancipa-
tion, not only regarding health inequalities, but also on
questions of justice and equity globally. This would move
the country’s foreign policy rhetoric beyond the level of
anachronistic Marxist or dependency theories that con-
tradict South Africa’s free-market macroeconomic and
trade policies.
A suggested agenda for AIDS diplomacy
Six broad areas or sets of issues could frame an emer-
ging AIDS diplomacy in South Africa. This list should
be prefaced with the observation that the development
of such niche diplomacy in itself could strengthen South
African democracy. The post-Mbeki foreign policy dis-
course in South Africa is slight, and a serious and focused
conversation in the epistemic and policy communities in
itself would be a worthwhile consequence of the develop-
ment of new foreign policy values and options.
It is imperative that such an exercise, particularly in
the case of this epidemic, should include members of
South Africa’s AIDS civil society. Just as the government
set an important AIDS diplomatic precedent with the
PhRMA case in the late 1990s, so the experience of TAC
and its global issue alliance partners would provide in-
valuable insights into the kind of nongovernmental and
transnational diplomacy that it practiced in the darkest
days of Mbeki’s AIDS denialism. In addition to the pos-
sible development of an inclusive definition of South
African AIDS diplomacy, this would also help to heal
the rifts that might still exist due to the antagonistic po-
sitions of the former administration on the one hand
and AIDS civil society on the other.
The first area of attention for AIDS diplomacy is global
trade, as “[the] trade and health linkage highlights the
new prominence of health within foreign policy” [42]. As
discussed above, both Brazil and South Africa have
strong records of achieving transformation in existing
multilateral trade rules regarding pharmaceuticals in par-
ticular. In addition, transnational issue networks from
both countries have achieved remarkable progress in ne-
gotiating lower prices for ARVs. South Africa should ad-
vance its trade agenda with a specific focus on the
facilitation of technology transfer, both north–south and
south-south.
The second agenda item for the application of an
AIDS diplomacy lens pertains to South Africa’s status as
an emerging middle power. Because this is a status that
the country wishes to entrench and build upon, it should
explore closer multilateral ties with Brazil (via IBSA) as
well as with other emerging middle powers, and it
should seek to align common goals for united healthdiplomacy. Such an initiative would reflect positively on
middle powers’ view that sovereignty is responsibility. Is-
sues that could be explored at the level of AIDS diplomacy
multilateralism include the transformation of the existing
architecture of global health governance. Sustained and
concerted public diplomacy and advocacy within the
World Health Assembly, the body that governs the WHO,
could be productive. This would demonstrate middle
powers’ ability to set the official agenda, instead of simply
affirming the list of priorities that emanates from Geneva
and New York.
Such an amended agenda should emphasize agency in
strengthening health systems in middle and low-income
states and highlight the need for sustainable funding of
health initiatives in poor countries. In engaging at the
multilateral level in this way, a country like South Africa
could give voice to those who are normally excluded
from such fora, including the elderly, women, children,
and people living with HIV. In the context of acting to
channel the voice of the disenfranchized, it is important
that activist states cooperate and consult in the first in-
stance with transnational activism networks in the global
south, rather than automatically following the ostensibly
benign agenda of civil society in the global north [43].
Third, South Africa could follow the example of South
American states and set up a regional institution focus-
ing on health issues within SADC. “The Pan-American
Health Organization (PAHO) [. . .] serves as a platform for
coalition-building and regional initiatives for Brazilian
pharmaceutical diplomacy” [44]. A pan-African organiza-
tion that is devoted to health issues more exclusively
might do better than subsuming health as one of many
policy areas at the SADC Secretariat. Given China’s stated
enthusiasm to expand its interests and influence on the
African continent, South Africa might request funding for
such an organization from the Chinese government, or it
may form a consortium of southern states via BRICS or
IBSA. Brazil could also play a role in mentoring Southern
African in its management of and strategy for such a
regional health body. One issue that could be
championed by South Africa within such a forum is
the expansion of the rights of minority groups against
whom there is increasing discrimination in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Gays and lesbians in particular are
persecuted in the SADC, and South Africa would do
well to share the lessons of its human rights approach
with sexual minorities.
Fourth, in addition to multilateral and regional AIDS
diplomacy, South Africa should also strengthen “cata-
lytic” diplomacy, which refers to multiple interactions
between diplomatic actors that “create a sort of symbi-
osis between state and non-state activities” [45]. Such an
initiative could reinforce and expand alliances between
members of domestic and foreign or transnational civil
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ingly critical role as global norm entrepreneurs, and this
function should be cultivated. As the executive director
of UNAIDS and his colleagues put it, “political momen-
tum can be built by linking HIV-issue specific networks
with movements that seek equity, justice and fairness in
relation to other concerns—be they related to funding,
trade, access to technology or climate change” [46].
The fifth area in which AIDS diplomacy could be benefi-
cial is in training and retaining health personnel, and ad-
dressing the causes of the unequal global distribution of
doctors and (especially) nurses. This is a critical area for
the management of AIDS and other infectious diseases,
and at the moment the global south loses thousands of its
medical personnel to the global north every year. Africa
has 2.3 health workers per 1000 population, whereas in
the Americas there are 24.8 healthcare workers per 1000
[47]. Any initiative to address this issue should reflect on
both the push and the pull factors—facile condemnation
of rich countries’ recruitment practices should not blind
governments in the global south to those determinants of
health personnel migration that are within their control.
South Africa might start such an initiative by pushing for
progress on developing more advanced international codes
of conduct on the recruitment of health personnel. Specif-
ically in the context of the AIDS pandemic, South Africa
could facilitate initiatives to strengthen the health work-
force by exploring innovations around task-shifting to de-
liver HIV services [48].
Finally, South Africa can take the lead in training health
diplomats. During June 18–22, 2007, the Graduate Institute
of International Relations in Geneva ran its first Summer
Program on Global Health Diplomacy, and it would be
fairly simple to build a health/AIDS diplomacy element
into the existing training that diplomats in Pretoria re-
ceive. Such training is essential, as “[h]ealth diplomacy
requires new interdisciplinary approaches for health sci-
ences education to prepare professionals who will manage
persistent and emerging global heath challenges” [49]. The
training can also be made available to the diplomatic
trainees of other states.
At the moment the University of Pretoria is the only
Southern African tertiary education facility that has a for-
mal postgraduate program on diplomacy as a distinct field
of study. This can be expanded to other institutions, and a
curriculum on AIDS and health diplomacy could include
key areas of interest such as clinical diplomacy (particu-
larly in non-Western settings), health security, human
rights, social justice and equity, health manpower, global
science, global economics, and changing aid agendas.
Some caveats
With any opportunity there are risks, and if South Africa
decides to develop a nascent AIDS diplomacy it should beaware of a few fairly obvious potential hazards. First, avoid
an agenda that is conceptualized in excessively broad or
ambitious terms; keep AIDS diplomacy or health diplo-
macy more generally practicable and take care not to
make the mistake of trying to do too much too soon. Add-
itionally, resist the temptation to securitize health or AIDS
as policy issues. Political science and international rela-
tions courses are hardwired with a state-centric and Real-
ist perspective, and this might trickle into understandings
of all human security issues. As discussed above, health
diplomacy is not the same as health security.
South Africa’s AIDS policy rehabilitation since 2008 has
led to many constructive changes. The country has been
remarkably successful with its test-and-treat program, and
the denialism of the Mbeki era truly seems to be a thing
of the past, at least at the level of government. Yet, AIDS
diplomacy should not lead to a wholesale embrace of the
current medical triumphalism, or of “best practice” mod-
els that have been developed in different contexts.
Lastly, niche or issue diplomacy is exactly that; it should
not overtake the overall foreign policy directives of any
state. South African foreign policy cannot only be about
health and AIDS; the latter should be complementary to a
broader strategy and evolving consensus about the kind of
state and society that South Africa wants to be, and how it
wishes to project itself beyond its borders.
As such, the national department of health should not
be the institutional custodian of South Africa’s foreign
policy—the point is that health and HIV/AIDS cut
across all levels and departments of government. Rather,
AIDS diplomacy should reside at a cross-departmental
level, most probably in the president’s office.
Summary
Instrumentally, South Africa can cultivate a foreign pol-
icy motive theme around Global Health in general and
AIDS specifically to regain some of the soft power and
credibility that the country has lost due to the Mbeki
administration’s AIDS denialism. But why would other
states believe this, or think that South African AIDS dip-
lomacy is worth emulating? The short answer is that
institutionally, historically as well as in terms of prece-
dent, the makings of AIDS diplomacy as a feature of
South African foreign policy are already in place. There
are four broad theses in support of such a statement:
Firstly, in September 2006 the country was a founding
member of the Global Health and Foreign Policy Initia-
tive, which explicitly frames health as the most import-
ant long-term foreign policy issue of our time. Secondly,
South Africa is one of very few states which enshrines
the Right to Health in its Constitution. Thirdly, the
country is exemplar of significant and recent precedent
in the use of transnational issue networks for global
change: (1) institutional memory remains strong with
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and public diplomacy, and through the accrual of soft
power; (2) after global pharmaceutical companies cynic-
ally challenged the new South African Medicine’s Act in
1997, in April 2001 a global campaign driven by a right-
to-health ethos and a supportive, progressive Constitu-
tion led to the defeat of these big PhRMA; (3) in No-
vember 2001 Brazil and South Africa worked with other
emerging middle powers and transnational civil society
campaigners to successfully challenge the existing TRIPS
Agreement specifications regarding the availability of
pharmaceuticals in poor countries that experience epi-
demic distress; (4) the country’s foreign policy on paper as
well as in practice is strongly in favour of progressive and
radical change to the status quo. Lastly, South Africa has
already demonstrated significant HIV/AIDS policy and
practice rehabilitation since the departure of President
Thabo Mbeki: it now manages the largest national test-
and-treat AIDS programme in the world, and it has em-
braced AIDS policy good practice emanating from the
World Health Organization. A country which radically
challenged and ultimately defeated its nefarious racist pol-
icies in the past has now also rehabilitated its AIDS man-
agement—why should the outside world praise the
country for the former, but not for the latter?
The Oslo Ministerial Declaration on the link between
health and foreign policy has opened a window of oppor-
tunity for a concerted effort to mainstream health as an
issue to be used not only to affirm the status quo of global
health governance, but also to reform the health architec-
ture and to consider the kind of global order that might be
possible. Similarly, AIDS diplomacy can be a project of
transformation and emancipation for South Africa, which
is in need of a refocused and rejuvenated foreign policy.
The country has overcome dread before, transforming the
legacy of apartheid into an example for the rest of the
world to admire. By exploring innovative diplomacy,
South Africa can use AIDS as an issue to consolidate its
young democracy, and it can work with transnational issue
networks to strengthen middle power multilateralism
more broadly. If South Africa can get this right, it has the
real potential to turn dread into capital, rather than to de-
fault to positions of impotence and blaming outsiders.
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